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Abstract Collective action, or the large-scale cooperation in the pursuit of public
goods, has been suggested to have evolved through cultural group selection. Previous
research suggests that the costly punishment of group members who do not contribute
to public goods plays an important role in the resolution of collective action dilem-
mas. If large-scale cooperation sustained by the punishment of defectors has evolved
through the mechanism of cultural group selection, two implications regarding costly
punishment follow: (1) that people are more willing to punish defecting group
members in a situation of intergroup competition than in a single-group social
dilemma game and (2) that levels of “perverse” punishment of cooperators are not
affected by intergroup competition. We find confirmation for these hypotheses.
However, we find that the effect of intergroup competition on the punishment of
defectors is fully explained by the stronger conditionality of punishment on expected
punishment levels in the competition condition.
Keywords Collective action . Evolution . Cultural group selection . Punishment
Humans excel in large-scale cooperation for public goods, also known as collective
action. Examples include participating in demonstrations, paying taxes, making
donations to charities, or protecting natural resources. Public goods can only be
obtained when several individuals cooperate, but once they are obtained it is not
possible to exclude individuals from consuming them. That people often cooperate
despite the fact that they could profit from the provisioning of public goods regardless
of whether they contributed to their production has intrigued scholars, particularly
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sociologists and economists, for many years (e.g., Olson 1965). Recently, evolutionary
scholars have also turned to this question (Boyd and Richerson 1982, 1985; Henrich
2004). Traditional explanations of the evolution of cooperation cannot explain this
typical form of human cooperation (Henrich 2004). For instance, reciprocal altruism,
commonly used to explain the evolution of cooperation among nonrelatives, cannot
explain the evolution of collective action. Axelrod (1984) has shown with his famous
computer tournaments that targeting cooperation toward those who cooperated, and
targeting defections toward those who defected, is a successful strategy in the
repeated, two-person prisoner’s dilemma. Reciprocal altruism, however, can only
sustain cooperation in small groups (Boyd and Richerson 1988). In large groups, it is
impossible to direct behavior to specific individuals depending on their previous
behavior. Instead, in collective action one either cooperates with everybody or defects
on everybody (Gil-White and Richerson 2003).
Punishment of uncooperating group members—often referred to as “altruistic
punishment” (e.g., Barclay 2006; Boyd et al. 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fowler
2005)—has been suggested as an important mechanism for stabilizing collective
action. If defectors must reckon with punishment, cooperating may become a rational,
or at least a less irrational, thing to do (Richerson and Boyd 2005: chap. 6). Empirical
data suggest that punishment is common in human societies (Boehm et al. 1993).
Experimental research has shown that individuals are willing to punish group mem-
bers (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000; Ostrom et al. 1992; Yamagishi 1986), even in one-
shot interactions (e.g., Shinada and Yamagishi 2007). Cooperation levels in both
ethnographic experiments and social dilemma games are higher when punishment is
possible than in similar situations or games without this possibility (e.g., Bochet et al.
2006; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Heldt 2005b; Henrich et al. 2006; Masclet et al. 2003).
Apart from the fear of being punished, people have also been shown to contribute
more if the possibility of punishment exists because they expect others to contribute
more (Shinada and Yamagishi 2007). The problem with the punishment solution to
the collective action problem, however, is that it entails another collective action
problem because punishing defecting group members entails costs to the punisher
whereas the benefits of increased cooperation are enjoyed by the whole group,
including those who did not participate in the costly punishment (Axelrod 1986;
Marlowe et al. 2008; Yamagishi 1986).
A currently popular approach that offers a potential solution to these explanatory
problems is cultural group selection. In short, the theory implies that when groups
with different cultural traits, such as norms, values, or ideas, compete, groups with
more group-beneficial cultural traits will replace the less-efficient groups. The pro-
portion of individuals with group-beneficial traits will consequently increase in the
global population (Boyd and Richerson 1982, 1985, 1990; Henrich and Boyd 2001).
As with other forms of collective action, punishment of defectors has been argued
to have evolved through cultural group selection (e.g., Boyd et al. 2005; Richerson
and Boyd 1999). Groups whose individuals were willing to punish those who did not
contribute to the provisioning of public goods would have been better off in inter-
group competition than other groups because cooperation can be sustained at a higher
level when punishment is possible (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gürerk et al. 2006).
As a consequence, ideas, norms, and values leading to the punishment of defectors
would spread (Boyd and Richerson 1982, 1985; Henrich and Boyd 2001).
174 Hum Nat (2012) 23:173–190
Importantly, some authors have argued that punishment of defecting group members can
more easily evolve through cultural group selection than cooperation itself because the
costs of punishment are strongly frequency-dependent: when defectors are rare, being a
punisher is not very costly (Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich and Boyd 2001).
Three types of group selection that have been identified in the literature differ in
the way in which cultural groups replace other groups (Henrich 2004; Van Veelen and
Hopfensitz 2007). The first type is marked by differential population growth: some
groups grow faster than others. This process is mathematically similar to the kin
selection process (Lehmann et al. 2007; McElreath and Boyd 2007). The second type
of cultural group selection is more subtle because the faster growth of some cultural
groups is a result of their cultural traits being copied by neighboring groups more than
other groups’ traits (e.g., Henrich 2004). In the third type of cultural group selection
two groups directly compete for resources—for instance, through warfare. Owing to
between-group differences, some cultural groups are more likely to survive this direct
intergroup competition than other groups.
Importantly, only the third type of cultural group selection predicts differential
behavior in situations with and without direct intergroup competition. In the first two
types of cultural group selection, contributing to collective action can give groups
with more group-beneficial cultural traits a selective advantage over other groups
because they grow larger and form more daughter groups, or because their larger
numbers or greater prosperity gives them a competitive edge once direct between-
group conflict occurs. However, direct intergroup competition is unlikely to influence
patterns of group-beneficial behavior as a consequence of these two processes
because it is not required for these processes to take place. The theory of cultural
group selection thus predicts that people will to some extent contribute to collective
action when there is no direct between-group conflict. However, when a group is in
direct competition with another group, as in the third type of group selection model,
contributing to the group’s welfare is even more important for the group’s survival:
“In times of peace they may compete for resources, but a war is survived together or
not at all” (Van Veelen and Hopfensitz 2007). A model by Bowles (2009) showed that
participation in warfare could indeed have had a significant influence on the evolu-
tion of the human capacity to participate in collective action.
The essential role of between-group competition in the third type of cultural group
selection caused many authors to suggest that if this type of cultural group selection
played a significant role in the evolution of collective action, a psychological
predisposition to increase within-group cooperation for public goods in situations
of between-group competition should have evolved (Burton-Chellew et al. 2010;
Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Puurtinen and Mappes 2009; Van Veelen and Hopfensitz
2007).
Experimental research has indeed shown that between-group competition
increases within-group cooperation for a public good (Baron 2001; Baron et al.
2005; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef 1994; Burton-Chellew et al. 2010; Puurtinen and
Mappes 2009; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007; West et al. 2006). There is however no
experimental evidence on the influence of between-group competition on punishment
behavior.
Given the emphasis on between-group competition as a key to the evolution of
collective action, and the emphasis on its effect on cooperation in social dilemmas, it
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is striking that much of the experimental evidence on the role of punishment in social
dilemmas derives from single-group experiments. If the human capacity to behave in
an individually costly but group-beneficial way has evolved through cultural group
selection, this should be reflected particularly in behavioral patterns in situations of
group competition. In particular, two important corollaries follow from current
theories of cultural group selection. First, if altruistic punishment has played a key
role in the evolution of collective action through cultural group selection, punishment
of defecting group members should be more prevalent in between-group competitive
settings. As Fehr and Fischbacher (2003:790) have emphasized, this implication of
the cultural group selection argument has not yet been empirically investigated.
Second, previous research has shown that a small but non-negligible portion of
participants punishes cooperating group members (Cinyabugama et al. 2006). Since
this behavioral pattern is unlikely to increase within-group cooperation, and therefore
cannot have been subject to cultural group selection, it is unlikely to increase with
between-group competition. We thus expect that people display similar levels of
punishment of cooperating group members in conditions with and without between-
group competition.
We thus test two hypotheses in this paper:
H1: In n-person prisoner’s dilemmas with a punishment option, people will be more
inclined to punish defecting group members when there is between-group
competition compared with single-group conditions.
H2: In n-person prisoner’s dilemmas with a punishment option, there will be no
significant difference in the tendency to punish cooperating group members
between conditions with between-group competition and single-group
conditions.
We investigate these hypotheses by comparing the behavior of participants in
single-group and intergroup n-person prisoner’s dilemmas with a punishment option.
For the intergroup n-person prisoner’s dilemmas, we utilize a slightly modified
version of Bornstein and colleagues’ (Bornstein 1992; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef
1994) intergroup prisoner’s dilemma (hereafter: IPD). In the IPD, two groups of
participants compete over a monetary bonus. The percentage of the bonus the
members of a group receive depends on the number of cooperators in this group
compared with the number of cooperators in the other group. Within each group, each
member receives an equal share of the bonus, independent of whether or not this
individual contributed to it. Further details on the distribution of money dependent on
contribution decisions in both groups can be found in the methods section of this
paper.
As did Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), we implemented two versions of the
single-group n-person prisoner’s dilemma game (PD): a “low payoff” and a “high
payoff” version. In comparisons of participants’ behavior in the IPD and PD, having
high and low payoff versions of the PD allows us to control for the effect of the
absolute size of payoffs that can be made in the IPD. In all conditions, participants
were given the opportunity to spend a portion of the earnings they made in the
experimental game on punishing group members.
We opted for a two-stage design: each participant made one contribution decision
in the IPD or PD, and then in the following round participants were allowed to punish
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group members. Since we were interested in determining whether participants had a
stronger innate predisposition or preference to punish defectors in situations of
between-group competition, we wanted to look at participants’ “intuitive” response
to the PD or IPD. When participants play a social dilemma game for multiple rounds
in the same group, punishment might be influenced by such strategic considerations
as future gains, which were not the scope of this paper. A consequence of our decision
is that this specific experiment cannot examine any difference in the influence of
punishment on cooperation levels between the PD and the IPD since the positive
influence of punishment on cooperation has been shown to be especially prevalent
after a certain number of rounds in repeated experiments (Gächter et al. 2008).
Methods
Participants were Dutch students who were recruited through flyers and posters at the
VU University campus in Amsterdam or through an e-mail that was sent to partic-
ipants in a previous experiment who had indicated that they were willing to partic-
ipate in future experiments. Flyers, posters, and e-mails contained a hyperlink to a
website on which more information was given about the procedure of the experiment.
The website contained a further hyperlink to a pre-experimental questionnaire. This
questionnaire began with a thorough explication of all stages of the experimental
procedure, after which participants signed informed consent. Then, participants filled
out a pre-experimental questionnaire.
Online experiments have become more and more common in recent years. The
decision to run our experiments online was motivated by two reasons. First, a large
sample size is easier to reach online. Second, complete anonymity vis-à-vis other
participants, which is an important condition for social dilemma games of this type, is
more assured online. Previous research directly comparing online and offline experi-
ments has shown that performing experiments online or in the lab does not signifi-
cantly alter the results (Amichai-Hamburger 2005; Carpenter et al. 2009; Koopmans
and Rebers 2009). Further, Isaac et al. (1994) have shown that increasing the time
span of an experiment over several days instead of hours, which is one of the
consequences of our online design, did not change participants’ behavior.
Experimenters continued recruiting participants until a total of 180 students had
indicated they wanted to participate in the experiment. Then, experimenters formed
groups of six randomly chosen participants. Within a week after a participant filled in
the pre-experimental questionnaire, he or she would receive an e-mail containing a
hyperlink to a website containing the prisoner’s dilemma stage of the experiment.
Participants were allowed two working days to fill in this stage. After these 2 days,
participants would receive another e-mail with a hyperlink to the second stage of the
game, the punishment stage. Participants who did not fill in a specific stage within the
allotted time frame were excluded from further participation in the experiment. We set
their decision in the PD or IPD to “group account” in cases in which they did not
complete this stage, and to “no punishment” if they did not complete the punishment
stage. Of course, these default decisions for participants who dropped out do not enter
into our results. They were only used to determine the earnings of participants at the
end of the game.
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To ensure that participants understood the structure of the game, four test questions
had to be answered correctly before they could make decisions. After all stages had
been completed, decisions made by participants were collected, and participants were
paid via internet banking. Participants were paid €4.00 for the pre-experimental
questionnaire, provided they participated in the complete experimental game as well.
This ensured that participants would at least get a decent base payment for partici-
pation independent of their earnings in the experimental game. Payoffs from the
experimental game depended on the decisions a participant made, the decisions made
by payoff group members, and, in the intergroup competition condition, the decisions
made by members of the competing group.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Stage
Our version of the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) is a variation on that of
Bornstein and his colleagues (Bornstein 1992; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef 1994). The
main difference is that we used groups of six individuals instead of three in order to
decrease the impact one individual had on the public good and thus to increase the
similarity between the experiment and real-life collective action dilemmas. Two
groups of six participants competed against each other. Each participant received an
endowment of €2.00, which he or she could contribute to a group account (cooper-
ation) or put in a private account (defection). Each group had one group account, and
each participant had his or her own private account. Money put in the group account
increased the portion of a monetary bonus of €43.20 one’s group earned. The portion
of the bonus that a group received was divided among all group members indepen-
dent of whether or not individuals had cooperated. A participant who put his or her
money in the private account received both his or her endowment of €2.00 and a
share of the group bonus. Table 1 shows payoffs participants received when they put
their endowment in the group account or the private account, depending on the
number of cooperators in both groups. As can be seen, defectors always received
€2.00 more than cooperators in the same group. Further, the table shows that when
everyone in group A cooperated and everyone in group B defected, group A received
the complete monetary bonus of € 43.20 (€ 7.20 per group member), whereas group B
received nothing. Further, if both groups put equal amounts of money in the group
accounts, each group received half of the bonus. For intermediate differences, groups
received their bonuses accordingly. Regardless of how much money the other group
put in the group account, within one’s own group the game was structured as a social
dilemma.
Single-Group Games
In the single-group-with-low-payoff game, six participants play a prisoner’s dilemma.
The payoffs of this game are similar to those in the competition game when all group
members in the other group put their money in the group account (Table 2).
The single-group-high-payoff game is similar to the single-group-low-payoff
game except that the payoffs are similar to the situation in the competition
game in which the other group put €0.00 in their group account. For payoffs,
see Table 3.
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The two PD games and the IPD are structurally similar: in all games, putting the
endowment in the private account pays €2.00 for the individual participant, and
putting money in the group account pays €0.60 for each group member (including
the contributor) from the group bonus. There are two single-group games (not just
one) to control for possible effects of the absolute size of the payoffs.
Punishment Stage
In the punishment stage, participants were allowed to punish group members. Of
course, the term “punishment” was not used. Instead, participants were told they had
Table 1 Payoffs for a participant in the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma by chosen account and difference in
group accounts
Monetary difference in group accounts (in euros;
(group A minus group B)


















Table 2 Payoffs for a participant in the single-group-low-payoff game by chosen account and amount of
money on the group account
Money in group account (in euros) Payoff in chosen account (in euros)
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the opportunity to reduce other group members’ payoffs. In line with earlier research
(Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Henrich et al. 2006; Shinada et
al. 2004), the costs of being punished were three times the costs of administering
punishment. This level of “punishment effectiveness” has been shown to be sufficient
to increase within-group cooperation (Egas and Riedl 2005; Nikiforakis and
Normann 2008). Punishment was allowed in increments of €0.10, thereby reducing
a group member’s payoff by increments of €0.30. Punishments had to be paid for by
the earnings in the PD or IPD. Thus the more money one makes, the more one can
punish. Further, a group member could not be punished more than the amount of
money he or she earned in the first stage. The punishment round ended with a short
post-experimental questionnaire. Subsequently, participants were paid via internet
banking.
Of the 180 students who indicated they wanted to participate in the experiment,
147 actually participated. Of those 147 participants, 130 completed all stages of the
experiment. We omitted the data of eight participants because they did not follow the
rules of the game; either they spent money to punish themselves, they spent more
money to punish other group members than was allowed, or, as happened in one case,
because the same participant participated twice. Our analysis is therefore based on the
decisions of 122 subjects: 40 in the single-group-low-payoff condition, 40 in the
single-group-high-payoff condition, and 42 in the competition condition. A chi-
square analysis revealed that the dropout level did not differ between single-group
and competition conditions (p00.736).
Pilot Experiment
To ensure that the facts that our groups were larger and that we conducted the
experiment online did not preclude comparison with the study of Bornstein and
Ben-Yossef (1994), we first replicated their study without punishment. In other
words, we conducted the three conditions of our experiment (single-group-low-
payoff, single-group-high-payoff, and intergroup competition) without the punish-
ment stage. After excluding three participants who had not completed the entire
experiment, 29, 28, and 30 participants, respectively, remained in the single-group-
Table 3 Payoffs for a participant in the single-group-high-payoff game by chosen account and amount of
money on the group account
Money in group account (in euros) Payoff in chosen account (in euros)
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low-payoff, single-group-high-payoff, and competition conditions. In these three con-
ditions, respectively 38 %, 36 %, and 70 % of the participants contributed their
endowment to the group account. Mann-Whitney U-tests indicate no significant differ-
ence in cooperation levels between the two single-group conditions (U0397.00; p0
0.864), and that the difference between the intergroup competition and single-group
conditions was highly significant (U0571.500; p00.003). Participants were thus
significantly more likely to contribute their endowment to the group account in the
competition condition compared with the single-group conditions. This replicates the
two key findings of Bornstein and Ben-Yossef's study. We therefore conclude that
group size and the online setting of our experiment do not bias our results.
Results
In the single-group-low-payoff, single-group-high-payoff, and competition condi-
tions, respectively 40 %, 43 %, and 53 % of the participants contributed their
endowment to the group account. A Mann-Whitney U-test showed that in line with
Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), and in line with our pilot experiment, there was no
significant difference in cooperation levels between the two single-group conditions
(U01005.500, p00.791). However, in contrast to these findings on the effects of
intergroup competition in situations without punishment, we do not find a significant
difference between the cooperation levels in single-group and competition conditions
(U01977.500, p00.202).
In the punishment stage, participants in the low-payoff, high-payoff, and competition
conditions respectively spent €0.22, €0.24, and €0.45 to punish other group members.
Of these amounts, respectively €0.17, €0.17, and €0.39 were used to punish defectors. A
linear regression analysis reveals a significant difference between the two single-group
and the competition conditions (B021.571, p00.041) Participants on average spent
€0.04, €0.07, and €0.07 to punish cooperators. The difference between the two single-
group and the competition conditions is not significant (B01.405, p00.762). Cooper-
ators on average spent more money on punishment (€0.39) than defectors (€0.22).
These results are in line with the expectations of hypotheses 1 and 2, but before we
accept these hypotheses, we want to put them to a more refined test. As a first step,
we check whether the interdependence between the individuals playing a prisoner’s
dilemma in one group makes it necessary to use multi- instead of single-level
analyses. Such interdependence can occur because all participants in a group received
the same information (and different information than members of other groups) about
cooperating and defecting behavior of group members in the prisoner’s dilemma
stage. A chi-square test revealed that a two-level model, with amount of money spent
on punishing defecting group members as dependent variable, indeed had a significantly
better fit than a single-level model (p00.013), which implies that it is necessary to use
multi-level regression analyses in which we distinguish two hierarchical levels: the
lower level of the individual and the individual’s decisions and the higher level of the
group in which the individual played the prisoner’s dilemma. For the analysis of the
determinants of punishment of cooperators, preliminary analyses showed that multi-
level analysis is not necessary because there was no significant variance at the group
level. We therefore use standard linear regression analysis to test hypothesis 2.
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Hypothesis 1
Model I in Table 4 shows that in a multilevel model the effect of competition on the
level of punishment of defectors is significant (p00.074; two-tailed), given that the
hypothesis is directional. In model II, we control for some of the variables that are
likely to influence the dependent variable. First, the actual number of defectors in the
group may affect punishment levels because it reflects the number of punishment
opportunities. Second, the amount of money a participant made in the prisoner’s
dilemma stage indicates the resources that an individual can employ to punish others.
Third, we control for whether or not someone contributed to the group account in the
prisoner’s dilemma stage, since our preliminary analyses indicated that cooperators
are more likely to punish defectors. The first and third of these variables indeed have
a significant positive influence on the dependent variable. In the third model, we add
the expectations participants had about the punishment level of their group members.
This variable was measured by asking the participants the following question in a
post-experimental questionnaire: “How much money do you think the other group
members on average spent on punishing other group members?” In the context of
public goods the expected contribution levels of others are known to be important
predictors for people’s contribution levels (Klandermans 1984, 1997; Koopmans and
Rebers 2009; Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000). Adding this variable to model III
indeed shows that the more participants expect others to spend on punishment, the
more they themselves spend on the punishment of defectors. The large increases in
the explained variances on both levels show the importance of this variable.
Table 4 Results of multilevel regression analyses with the amount of money spent on punishing defecting
group members as the dependent variable. Reported in the table are (unstandardized) regression coeffi-










Intercept 16.369 (0.037) −43.469 (0.196) −53.778 (0.054) −47.336 (0.084)
Competition condition 23.806 (0.074) 24.669 (0.054) 22.425 (0.034) 11.440 (0.311)
Number of defectors
in group
13.404 (0.016) 10.849 (0.018) 10.348 (0.021)
Earnings in the PD/IPD 0.018 (0.637) 0.020 (0.529) 0.019 (0.529)
Decision: group account 31.139 (0.014) 24.777 (0.016) 22.971 (0.024)






563.879 467.375 407.487 278.950 262.088
% reduction of variance 17.114 27.735 50.530 53.521
Residual variance
(individual level)
2514.314 2495.225 2305.132 1514.160 1466.496
% reduction of variance 0.759 8.320 39.778 41.674
Number of groups 30 30 30 30 30
Number of participants 122 122 122 122 122
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Controlling for the expected punishment level, the effect of the competition condition
becomes highly significant at the 5 % level (p00.034), which indicates that, at similar
expectation levels, people spent more money on the punishment of defectors in
conditions with intergroup competition.
Previous research has shown that not only are higher contribution levels to public
goods predicted by higher expected contribution levels of group members, but
individuals also react more strongly to these levels in conditions in which ingroup
biases are salient by giving people information on the cultural similarity between
themselves and other group members (Koopmans and Rebers 2009). We suspect that
this mechanism may also operate in situations of intergroup competition, which also
raises the salience of group boundaries. We therefore introduce in the fourth model an
interaction term between the competition condition and expected punishment levels.
Indeed, we find that this interaction term is significant, implying that participants
react more strongly to expectation levels in the competition condition than in the
single-group conditions. The direct effect of the competition condition now becomes
insignificant. This implies that punishment behavior of participants in the competition
condition is more strongly conditioned by expectations they have about others’
behavior than punishment behavior in the single-group conditions is.
In additional analyses (not reported in the table) we also controlled for sex, age,
and whether or not a participant had participated in one of our previous experiments.
Introduction of these variables does not affect any of the reported results. We
therefore conclude that hypothesis 1 is confirmed: intergroup competition increases
the level of punishment directed at defectors. However, the effect is not strong: it only
explains a small part of the variance and can be fully explained away by the stronger
reaction to expected punishment levels in the competition condition.
Hypothesis 2
As Table 5 shows, the amount participants spent on punishing cooperating group
members did not differ significantly between the competition and single-group con-
ditions. We also find that, though cooperators spent more money on the punishment of
defectors, cooperators and defectors spend equal amounts on the punishment of coop-
erators. When controlling for expected punishment levels, the number of cooperators in
a group has a significant influence on the amount spent on punishing them. Again,
expected punishment levels strongly influence the actual amount spent on the punish-
ment of cooperators. The interaction term between competition and expected punish-
ment levels remains insignificant. These findings remain similar when controlling for
sex, age, and whether or not a participant had participated in one of our previous
experiments (not reported). We can thus conclude that hypothesis 2 is confirmed:
intergroup competition does not lead to increased punishment of cooperators.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this experiment we found support for the two hypotheses that we derived from the
direct intergroup competition variant of the cultural group selection perspective. We
found confirmation for the expectation that in situations of between-group
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competition, people spend more resources on the punishment of defecting group
members. Also in line with the expectations, we found that between-group compe-
tition does not increase the resources people spend on the “perverse” punishment
(Cinyabugama et al. 2006) of cooperative group members.
The punishment of defectors can be seen as a form of collective action (Yamagishi
1986) and follows the expected pattern in situations of intergroup conflict (Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003). The fact that people are willing to punish cooperating group
members at all seems difficult to explain from a group selection perspective, since it
decreases group efficiency (Gächter and Herrmann 2009; Herrmann et al. 2008).
However, the fact that only the group-beneficial form of punishment, namely that
directed toward defectors, increases with intergroup competition, whereas intergroup
competition has no effect on the punishment of cooperators, is in line with a group
selection perspective.
The finding that defectors are more heavily punished in situations of between-
group competition is in line with a result reported by Marlowe et al. (2008), who
played experimental economic games in 12 societies and found that members of two
of these societies showed a relatively high willingness to punish. The authors
suggested that this was due to the recent history of warfare, a form of intergroup
competition, in these societies. The scarce field evidence for the effect of intergroup
competition on punishment thus seems to be consistent with the theory of cultural
group selection.
The prediction that intergroup competition increases within-group punishment is
shared by Lahti and Weinstein (2005). They argue that the smaller the chance that the
group in which an individual is embedded persists, the more likely it should be that
this individual will contribute to the group’s welfare. The same argument has been
explicated by Van Veelen and Hopfensitz (2007). In both papers it has been noted that
cooperative behavior can evolve because an individual’s chance of survival depends
on the group’s chance of survival in cases of intergroup competition. Van Veelen and
Hopfensitz argue that this mechanism should be referred to as a form of group
selection. Lahti and Weinstein, however, argue that since the group’s persistence is
in the individual’s best interest, the mechanism is a form of individual-level selection.
We agree that individual-level selection can play a role in the evolution of cooperative
Table 5 Results of linear regression analyses with the amount of money spent on punishing cooperating
group members as the dependent variable. Reported in the table are (unstandardized) regression coeffi-
cients, with significance levels in parentheses
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Intercept 5.500 (0.045) −6.893 (0.386) −16.080 (0.029) −15.345 (0.038)
Competition condition 1.405 (0.762) 0.746 (0.873) 0.282 (0.946) −2.184 (0.664)
Number of cooperators in group 3.449 (0.102) 4.308 (0.023) 4.406 (0.021)
Earnings in the PD/IPD 0.005 (0.719) 0.006 (0.663) 0.006 (0.658)
Decision: group account −2.332 (0.684) −4.899 (0.341) −5.270 (0.308)
Expectation 0.230 (0.000) 0.201 (0.000)
Expectation*competition condition 0.074 (0.383)
R2 0.001 0.036 0.240 0.245
Number of participants 122 122 122 122
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behavior if an individual’s cooperative act is crucial for the group’s survival. When
groups are larger, however, an individual’s cooperative act is rarely crucial for the
group’s survival. Yet, the more individuals cooperate, the higher the chance of the
group’s survival in situations of (direct or indirect) between-group competition. We
therefore argue that this mechanism can also explain the evolution of collective
action, in which an individual’s impact on the public good is always negligible
(Olson 1965), and that it should be considered a form of group selection.
In contrast to the punishment of defecting group members, the punishment of
cooperating group members cannot be explained by a group-selection perspective: in
the long run, the punishment of cooperators decreases the group’s welfare (Gächter
and Herrmann 2009; Herrmann et al. 2008). Many possible motivations for perverse
punishment have been identified in the literature (for an overview, see Gächter and
Herrmann 2009). Research is needed to identify their importance. Revenge for being
punished is probably the most commonly suggested motivation (Denant-Boemont et
al. 2007; Herrmann et al. 2008; Nikiforakis 2008), but it is not possible in our
experiment because we only implemented one punishment round. Our experiment
cannot exclude other motivations for perverse punishment, such as concerns for
dominance or a preference for higher relative payoffs. The important finding of our
experiment, however, is that whatever the motivation for perverse punishment is, it is
not influenced by between-group competition.
The findings of our experiment are thus in line with the predictions of a cultural
group selection argument. However, this does not imply that they cannot also be
interpreted in light of other ultimate explanations. Some authors, for instance, have
argued that individual-level selection mechanisms might be able to explain the
evolution of cooperative and punishment behavior in small-scale societies, and that
the psychological propensities thus evolved continue to structure modern human
behavior in situations of anonymous and large-scale human cooperation (e.g., Hagen
and Hammerstein 2006; Tooby and Cosmides 1989). When different ultimate
explanations predict a similar behavioral pattern, empirical findings such as ours
are unable to differentiate between them. Additional research is therefore needed to
investigate the plausibility of different ultimate explanations to explain our empirical
findings.
Although we found that punishment patterns were in line with the cultural
group selection hypothesis, it must be noted that the effect of intergroup com-
petition on the punishment of defectors remains small. First, the effect of
intergroup competition on the punishment of defectors is fully caused by the
stronger conditionality of punishment on expected punishment levels in the
competition condition. Second, expected punishment levels explain a much larger
share of the variance in the data than whether or not there is intergroup
competition. Apparently, not only are contributions to public goods largely
determined by what one expects others to contribute (Klandermans 1984, 1997;
Koopmans and Rebers 2009; Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000), but the group-beneficial
act of punishing defectors is also largely determined by how much one expects others
to punish. To the best of our knowledge, our experiment is the first to show this effect.
There has been some discussion regarding whether asking participants how much
they expect others to contribute really elicits their actual expectations. Some authors
have suggested that participants project their own behavior onto others’—the so-
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called false consensus effect, which in turn explains the correlation between the
answers to this question and cooperative behavior of participants (Dawes et al.
1977). Although we agree that part of the “expectations” could be projections, we
are convinced that at least part of it represents real expectations. First, the correlations
between expectations and contributions differ between specific contexts in which
differential projections of own behavior on others are unlikely. For instance, an
experiment showed that when the fear of getting the “sucker’s payoff” was made
more relevant in a social dilemma, the correlation between expectations and contri-
butions was stronger than in a similar social dilemma in which this fear was made
irrelevant (Yamagishi and Sato 1986). This suggests that those who contribute only
when they expect others to do so as well try to avoid being the “sucker,” which
indicates that expectations influence their own behavior instead of being a mere
reflection of it. The differential correlations between situations with and without
punishment is another example (Heldt 2005b). Second, experiments in which expect-
ations are not elicited in a questionnaire but with the strategy method show the same
conditional cooperation pattern as in our experiment: the more others contribute, the
more people are willing to contribute (Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Fischbacher et
al. 2001). Third, manipulating people’s expectations by giving people false informa-
tion about others’ contributions influences people’s own contributions. The higher
others’ presumed contributions, the higher participants’ contributions (Bicchieri
and Xiao 2009; Frey and Meier 2004; Heldt 2005a; Martin and Randal 2008).
Fourth, general trust in others increases cooperation in real life (Fukuyama 1995;
Joireman et al. 1997; Putnam 1993). The above evidence gives us confidence that the
expectations we elicited from our subjects to a large extent represent real expect-
ations. In line with many other authors, we therefore argue that many people
contribute to collective action depending on how much they expect others to do so
(Bogaert et al. 2008; Ellers and Van der Pool 2010; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Gächter
2006; Herrmann and Thöni 2009; Kocher et al. 2008; Koopmans and Rebers 2009;
Yamagishi et al. 2008).
Our results show that people react more strongly to expectations in situations of
intergroup competition. This finding confirms earlier research on contributions to
public goods in single groups, in which group composition varied with respect to
culturally transmittable traits (Koopmans and Rebers 2009). In this research, people
contributed more to the public good when it benefitted cultural ingroup members, but
this could be fully explained by higher expected cooperation levels of other group
members, on the one hand, and a stronger reaction toward those expectations, on the
other. The results of the current experiment are strikingly similar, as we found that
punishment of defectors could be explained by expectations of the inclination of other
group members to punish and a stronger reaction to these expectations in the
intergroup competition condition. These findings suggest that situations in which
group boundaries are made salient—by way of cultural similarity or intergroup
competition—lead to higher contribution levels—in the form of contributions to the
public good or altruistic punishment of defectors—by way of the mechanism of
expectations regarding the behavior of other group members. In other words, salient
group boundaries seem to work by triggering conditional participation in collective
action. Our findings point to the need for further research on the interplay between
group boundary salience, conditional cooperation and conditional punishment.
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Our experiment was aimed at investigating the intrinsic reaction of participants to
social dilemmas with and without between-group competition and showed that they
intuitively respond to situations of between-group competition with an increased
level of punishment to defecting group members. This finding cannot be due to
strategic considerations, because we chose a two-stage experiment with one contri-
bution round and one punishment round. The consequence of this choice, however, is
that our experiment cannot reveal the long-term effect on cooperation levels of the
tendency to punish defectors more in situations of between-group competition.
Previous research has shown that in the long run, punishment leads to increased
cooperation levels, both because of the fear of being punished and because those who
have been punished increase contributions (Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002). Further
research should show whether the increased tendency to punish in situations of
between-group competition leads to higher and more stable contribution levels
compared with repeated single-group games with punishment.
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